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The 1996 welfare reform legislation expanded the use of sanctions under the assumption
that welfare recipients can comply with work requirements and that they can calculate
the costs and benefits of compliance. This research tests the validity of these assumptions
through a record- and survey-based study of California welfare recipients. The article
questions the validity of the assumptions, finding that, compared to nonsanctioned recipients, sanctioned recipients face greater barriers to meeting the work requirements. A
significant proportion say that they were not informed about the sanctioning rules. Almost
half of sanctioned recipients were not aware that they were sanctioned.

While the use of financial penalties to enforce compliance has been a
feature of welfare since 1967, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 dramatically increases their importance by tightening work requirements, narrowing
exemption criteria, introducing new sanctionable behaviors, and offering states novel options for applying the rules (Goldberg and Schott
2000; U.S. General Accounting Office [USGAO] 2000). Replacing Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a block grant to the
states in order to finance the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
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(TANF) program, PRWORA also broadens the pool of welfare recipients
subject to sanctions (Greenberg and Savner 1999) in four ways.
First, federal work requirements are now more stringent. All nonexempt recipients who receive welfare for 24 consecutive months are required to engage in work activities within this time period. States that
fail to sanction recipients who do not meet these work requirements
are subject to a penalty of between 1 and 5 percent of their federal
block grant.
Second, PRWORA eliminates important federally guaranteed exemptions from the work requirement. States have several options in defining
who can be exempted or excused from mandatory work participation.
Few federal restrictions apply. Most notable is the elimination of the
exemption given to parents caring for a child below the age of 3 under
the former Job Opportunities and Basic Skills ( JOBS) program. However, states are prohibited from sanctioning parents with children under
the age of 6 if child care is not available.
Third, states are required to sanction recipients who fail to cooperate
with child-support enforcement rules that help establish the paternity
of children. The TANF program also introduces several new behavioral
targets. States have the option to use financial penalties to curb such
diverse recipient behaviors as truancy (for teens), substance abuse, and
failure to immunize children.
Finally, new policy options increase the significance of sanctions by
allowing states to design more stringent penalty structures. States are
free to choose full-family sanctions that eliminate both the adult and
child portions of the grant. States may also tinker with the sanction
durations such that, for example, the first act of noncompliance could
result in a 6-month penalty. In addition, states may impose a lifetime
ban on welfare receipt for repeated acts of noncompliance.

The Moral and Behavioral Logic of Sanctions
Some justify mandatory work requirements and the use of sanctions to
achieve compliance by suggesting that the state has the moral right to
impose its authority through work requirements and to sanction those
recipients who do not comply (Mead 1986). This justification is coupled
with the behavioral claim that welfare recipients make rational choices
in calculating the costs and benefits of being on welfare, complying with
work requirements, facing the threat of sanctions, and forgoing benefits
(Rector 1993). If recipients are truly needy, the costs of sanctions will
induce their compliance. Recipients who calculate that forgoing all or
part of their welfare grant costs less than complying with the work requirements are not truly needy.
This behavioral logic of sanctions involves two premises. The first is
that welfare recipients who face the threat of sanctions are capable of
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complying with the work requirements. Thus, the failure to comply signifies a lack of motivation or an unsubstantiated economic hardship. The
second is that welfare recipients are aware of the rules and can rationally
calculate the costs and benefits of complying. Yet, a growing body of
research questions the validity of both premises (for a comprehensive
review, see Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh 2003).

Barriers to Compliance
Educational and Employment Barriers
Studies suggest that sanctioned recipients may fail to comply with work
requirements because of personal barriers. For example, several studies
show that limited education and a poor work history increase a recipient’s risk of being sanctioned. A study in three cities (Boston, Chicago,
and San Antonio) finds that 43 percent of sanctioned recipients have
a high school education or passed the General Educational Development (GED) test, compared to 53 percent of recipients who were not
sanctioned (Cherlin et al. 2002). Ariel Kalil, Kristin Seefeldt, and Huichen Wang (2002) find that the odds of being sanctioned double for
recipients with less than a high school education. Studies of closed cases
in Arizona (Westra and Routley 2000), Delaware (Fein and Lee 1999),
and South Carolina (Edelhoch, Liu, and Martin 1999) also find that
sanctioned families have low levels of educational attainment. In Maryland, 41 percent of sanctioned families have no history of prior employment, compared to 31 percent of those recipients who left welfare
without being sanctioned (Born, Caudill, and Cordero 1999).
Health and Personal Well-Being Barriers
Problems with health or personal well-being also make it difficult for
recipients to attend work programs, thus raising their risk of being
sanctioned. Kalil and associates (2002) note that being diagnosed with
three or more mental health problems is a significant predictor of being
sanctioned. Another study finds that “welfare recipients with multiple
health problems (notably, physical abuse, risk of depression, and having
a chronically ill or disabled child) were more likely than other recipients
to have been sanctioned in the prior year” (Polit, London, and Martinez
2001, p. 5). In the Three Cities Study, 36 percent of sanctioned recipients
reported having poor health, compared to 25 percent of nonsanctioned
recipients (Cherlin et al. 2002). A study on sanctioned clients in Utah
finds that one-fifth of sanctioned families cited a mental health problem,
and one-third a physical problem, as a reason for not participating in
the state’s work program (Derr 1998). In Iowa, one-fifth of sanctioned
recipients reported that their health problems were the cause of repeated noncompliance (Nixon, Kauff, and Losby 1999). In the Three
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Cities Study, sanctioned recipients are twice as likely to have used hard
drugs as nonsanctioned recipients (Cherlin et al. 2002). Several studies
indicate that the presence of domestic violence is a significant predictor
of sanctions among welfare recipients (e.g., Polit et al. 2001; Kalil et al.
2002).
Logistical Barriers
Lack of resources can create logistical barriers to compliance among
welfare recipients. For example, recipients who cannot secure transportation or child care may find it difficult to comply with work requirements. Lack of transportation is a major obstacle to attending work
programs (Derr 1998; Fein and Lee 1999). The Three Cities Study finds
that only 19 percent of sanctioned recipients owned a car, compared
to 35 percent of nonsanctioned recipients (Cherlin et al. 2002). In Iowa,
over one-third of sanctioned families could not participate in work programs because of child-care problems (Nixon et al. 1999). David Fein
and Wang Lee (1999) and Kalil and colleagues (2002) find lack of child
care to be a statistically significant predictor of sanctions.

Knowledge and Awareness of Sanction Policies
Although systematic research on the issue is wanting, several studies
suggest that recipients may not be fully aware of the sanction policies
and their consequences. A study of sanctioned families in Tennessee
finds that 34 percent of the families did not understand the welfare
requirements (Overby 1998). The same is true of 25 percent of sanctioned parents in Iowa (Nixon et al. 1999). LaDonna Pavetti and Dan
Bloom (2001) report that many welfare offices have problems reminding
clients of sanction criteria and related dates. A report by the Office of
the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (1999) indicates that welfare recipients are seldom made aware
of good-cause exemptions from work program participation. In fact,
they are often led to believe that the sanctions for nonparticipation are
more severe than is the case. Evidence suggests that the most common
reason for being sanctioned is missed appointments (Goldberg and
Schott 2000; Cherlin et al. 2002).
Past studies, however, have several limitations. First, studies that rely
on self-reporting (e.g., Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002) are unable
to verify whether the recipients were officially sanctioned. As shown
below, many recipients are not aware that they have been sanctioned,
nor are they always able to associate grant reductions with sanctions.
Second, studies that rely on administrative records (e.g., Edelhoch et
al. 1999; Westra and Routley 2000) are unable to obtain the recipients’
perspectives on potential barriers. Third, previous studies do not mea-
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sure the degree to which recipients are knowledgeable about the rules,
including their awareness of sanctions (for an exception see Wilson,
Stoker, and McGrath 1999).
The research reported here on the California Work Opportunity and
Responsibility for Kids (CalWORKs) Four Counties Sanctions Study addresses these limitations. It tests the behavioral logic behind the use of
sanctions to change recipients’ behaviors by considering if sanctioned
recipients face greater barriers to compliance, if recipients are informed
about sanction policies, and if officially sanctioned recipients are aware
of their status.

The CalWORKs Four Counties Sanctions Study
Data for this study stem from a random sample of welfare recipients in
four counties in California (two large urban counties, labeled A and C,
and two large semirural counties, labeled B and D).1 CalWORKs, the
program reviewed here, imposes the following process for adult-only
sanctions: (a) the first sanction is applied until the noncompliant individual performs the previously refused activities; (b) the second sanction is applied for 3 months or until the recipient complies, whichever
is longer; and (c) the third sanction (and any subsequent sanction) is
applied for 6 months, or until the recipient complies, whichever is
longer.2 Nonexempt recipients are subject to financial sanctions when
they both fail to meet program requirements without good cause and
subsequently fail either to agree to a compliance plan during conciliation or to comply with the stipulations of the compliance plan.
In this study, administrative records are used to draw the sample and
identify sanctioned recipients. Telephone surveys with recipients are used
to obtain various measures of potential barriers and to assess both their
knowledge of the rules and their awareness of having been sanctioned.
Sample
To ensure that all recipients were exposed to the same sanctioning
policy, the sampling frame is restricted to single-parent female recipients
who (a) received aid for the first time during any month of 1999 (defined as “no aid receipt in the prior 12 months”), (b) were between the
ages of 18 and 50 years, and (c) were either English- or Spanish-speaking.
A recipient is identified as sanctioned if the recipient’s record shows a
sanction code coupled with a reduction in the grant amount for at least
1 of the 3 following months. The sample is stratified by county, ethnicity,
and sanction status to ensure adequate numbers for statistically precise
estimates.
The sampling frame consists of 3,414 recipients. Of these, the address
and telephone information was known for only 1,586 individuals. The
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response rate for contacting these individuals is 77 percent. Using available welfare administrative records, respondents and nonrespondents
(including those without known contact information) are compared on
ethnicity, age, native language, and number of children. There are no
statistically significant differences between the two groups. Analytic
weights, constructed to reflect differences in sampling rates, are applied
to all of the analyses reported here.
The final study sample of 1,202 women includes only those individuals
with complete data for all predictor variables. Of these, administrative
records indicate that 453 recipients were sanctioned for noncompliance
with the work requirements. During the survey interviews, an additional
89 self-reported sanctioned recipients were identified. These individuals
were penalized after the time frame covered in the administrative records. Thus, interviews and surveys identified a total of 542 sanctioned
recipients, and all are included in the analysis of barriers to compliance.3
Only the 453 single mothers identified through administrative records
are included in the analysis of recipients’ awareness of receiving sanctions. At the time of the interview, 58 percent of the sanctioned recipients received aid, compared to 45 percent of nonsanctioned recipients.
Measures of Barriers 4
Respondents are considered to have an educational barrier if they neither graduated from high school nor received a GED. Employment
barriers are measured by asking respondents about previous full- or parttime employment, and whether they were out of work throughout the
3 years prior to the survey.
A personal health barrier is identified as a long-term mental or physical health condition that interferes with work, school, or home life.
Substance use is identified by questions from the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; Kessler et al. 1994). Respondents are
considered to have a substance use problem if they reported drug or
alcohol use that interfered with their ability to work, go to school, or
function at home in the year prior to survey. Domestic violence is measured using items from the Conflict Tactics Scale (Strauss and Gelles
1986). It is defined here as being pushed, slapped, kicked, or hit,
whether with a fist or other object, by a household member in the 12
months prior to the survey.
Respondents have a transportation problem if they lacked access to
a car, a child-care problem if they rated themselves as having “serious”
or “very serious” difficulties obtaining child care in the month prior to
the survey, and a caregiver barrier if they reported having a household
member with a long-term health problem or disability that limited the
respondents’ ability to work. Data also are obtained on several demographic measures, such as county of residence, ethnicity, age, native
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language, presence in the household of a child under the age of 2, and
number of children under the age of 18.
Measures of Knowledge and Awareness
Knowledge of sanction policies is measured by asking all respondents
whether they were told about each of the seven major reasons for which
they could be sanctioned (ranging from failure to attend orientation
to quitting a job without good reason). After summing up recipient
responses, the index ranged from 0 to 7.
Awareness of sanctions incurred is assessed through a series of questions. Recipients were asked if their welfare check was reduced for not
attending each of several required CalWORKs activities (e.g., orientation, job club, assessment). If recipients did not identify themselves as
incurring sanctions in this manner, they were asked if they ever “received
a welfare check that was less” than what they used to get, and if so,
whether this reduction was because they “did not follow the welfare-towork rules.”5 Recipients who answered affirmatively to either of these
two questions are identified as self-reported sanctioned respondents.
Sanction awareness is coded as one for those who were aware of their
sanction (officially sanctioned and self-reporting as sanctioned) and zero
for those who were unaware of their sanction (officially sanctioned but
not self-reporting as sanctioned).
Because officially sanctioned recipients were interviewed on average
16.4 months after the sanction, it is not possible to fully test the causal
assumptions inherent in our analyses. In particular, the measure of employment barriers (i.e., work history in the 3 years prior to survey) may
be distorted by the time lag. Therefore, we estimate two logistic regression models: one without and one with work history. While the
results are essentially the same, the reader should be mindful of this
limitation in the interpretation of the results presented below.

Results
Barriers to Employment
To test the first premise of the behavioral logic concerning sanctions,
namely, that welfare recipients who face the threat of sanctions are
capable of complying with work requirements, a logistic regression
model is constructed to include the three types of barriers to compliance
and several control measures. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on
the variables in the model. The entire sample is clearly highly vulnerable.
As the first column of the table indicates, nearly one-third of the respondents had no high school diploma or GED, and almost half never
held a full-time job over a 3-year period. Chronic disability impinged
on the lives of many recipients. Approximately one in six recipients had
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Table 1
Respondent Characteristics (N p 1,202)

Characteristic
Demographics:
White
Black
Hispanic
Below age 24
Native English speaker
Child under age 2 in
household
Mean number of
children
Educational and employment barriers:
Some full-time worka
Some part-time worka
No worka
No high school
diploma
Health and personal
well-being barriers:
Health or mentalhealth problem
Substance use problem
Domestic violenceb
Logistical barriers:
No automobile in
household
Child-care problem
Household member ill
or disabled

Percent of All
Respondents

Percent of Sanctioned
Respondents

Percent of
Nonsanctioned
Respondents

35.0
29.7
35.3
17.7
84.7

34.4
31.9
33.7
22.1*
90.2**

35.2
28.9
35.9
16.1*
82.7**

19.8

22.9

18.7

1.98

2.10*

1.93*

54.0
33.7
12.2

37.8**
42.2**
20.1**

59.9**
30.7**
9.4**

29.0

34.2*

27.1*

16.9
1.5
12.7

15.9
2.3
14.2

17.2
1.2
12.1

51.6
20.1

60.7**
19.6

48.3**
20.3

7.8

10.7*

6.8*

* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
a
Work in the 3 years prior to the survey.
b
Domestic violence in the 12 months prior to survey.

a serious long-term health or mental health problem that interfered
with their daily living. Self-reported problematic substance use was less
common among the sample, with less than 5 percent of the women
reporting disruptive use. Almost 13 percent of the recipients reported
incidents of domestic violence over the 1 year prior to the survey. More
than half of the women lacked access to a car, and close to 20 percent
reported child-care difficulties. Nearly one in 10 reported disruption of
their work life in order to care for an ill or disabled relative.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 1 compare the sanctioned and nonsanctioned recipients in the study sample. Sanctioned mothers were younger
and had more children, limited work experience, and fewer educational
credentials. They were more burdened with transportation constraints
and caring for ill or disabled relatives. There are particularly striking
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Table 2
Effect Parameters for the Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting
Sanctioning (N p 1,202)
Predictor Variable
Model 1
e

Demographic variables:
County B
County C
County D
Black
Hispanic
Below age 24
Native English
speaker
Child under age 2 in
household
Number of children
Educational and employment barriers:
Some part-time work
No work
No high school
diploma
Health and personal
well-being barriers:
Health or mental
health problem
Substance use
problem
Domestic violence
Logistical barriers:
No automobile in
household
Child-care problem
Household member
ill or disabled

.12
.38
.40
.26
.11
.38

(.19)
(.16)
(.16)
(.13)
(.15)
(.18)

.96 (.25)
⫺.30 (.18)
.15 (.06)

.35 (.16)

Model 2
eb

e

1.12
1.46*
1.49*
1.29*
1.12
1.47*

.03
.43
.30
.36
.20
.28

2.63**

.99 (.25)

.97
1.16*

1.42*

(.21)
(.17)
(.17)
(.15)
(.16)
(.19)

eb

1.03
1.54*
1.35
1.44*
1.22
1.32
2.69**

⫺.07 (.19)
.13 (.06)

.93
1.34*

.79 (.15)
1.16 (.22)

2.19**
3.18**

.23 (.17)

1.26

.73

⫺.17 (.18)

.83

⫺.32 (.19)

.76 (.45)
.22 (.18)

2.14
1.24

.87 (.44)
.18 (.19)

2.38*
1.20

.33 (.15)
⫺.14 (.18)

1.39*
.87

.47 (.24)

1.61*

.40 (.14)
⫺.17 (.18)
.52 (.23)

1.49**
.84
1.69*

Note.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

differences between the sanctioned and nonsanctioned respondents in
work histories and in whether they owned a car. Only 38 percent of the
sanctioned recipients reported full-time employment over a 3-year period, compared to 60 percent of the nonsanctioned recipients. Likewise,
only 39 percent of the sanctioned recipients owned a car, compared to
52 percent of the nonsanctioned recipients. Contrary to what might be
expected, most of the sanctioned recipients are native English speakers
(90 percent) compared to the nonsanctioned recipients (83 percent).
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis. Model
1 excludes work history while model 2 includes it. In both models, native
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English speakers are considerably more likely to be sanctioned than
nonnative English speakers (odds p 2.6 in both models). This finding
may reflect the differential effects of the CalWORKs program options,
allowing recipients who do not speak English to attend English as a
second language (ESL) classes instead of meeting the work requirements. It may also reflect the reluctance of case managers to impose
sanctions on those with language barriers. In addition, being black increases the odds of being sanctioned by 1.29 in model 1 and by 1.44
in model 2, compared to whites, suggesting possible racial bias on the
part of welfare workers (see also Kalil et al. 2002).
Each additional child in the household increases the odds of being
sanctioned by a factor of 1.16 in model 1 and by 1.34 in model 2
(independent of the availability of child care). Finally, the odds of being
sanctioned are about 1.5 times higher in counties C and D in model 1
(but only in county C in model 2) compared to the other counties,
suggesting that differential practices among local welfare offices can
affect the risk of incurring sanctions (Pavetti and Bloom 2001).
An examination of educational and employment barriers highlights
lack of high school degree in model 1 and poor work history in model
2 as significant predictors of incurring sanctions. In model 1, not having
a high school degree increases the risk of being sanctioned by 1.42. In
model 2, recipients with only part-time employment over a 3-year period
are twice as likely to be sanctioned, and those with no work experience
are over three times more likely to be sanctioned than those who had
worked full time. While causal direction in model 2 is unclear, perhaps
a lack of attachment or a tenuous attachment to the labor force make
it more difficult for recipients to comply with the welfare-to-work
requirements.
Contrary to findings in other studies, health and mental health problems do not increase the likelihood of being sanctioned. In fact, although not statistically significant, the trend is in the opposite direction
(odds p 0.83 and 0.73, respectively). This may reflect the fact that,
unlike 19 other states, California offers a statewide exemption from work
requirements for personal disabilities.6 Nevertheless, in both models,
recipients with a self-reported substance use problem are over two times
more likely (odds p 2.14 and 2.38, respectively) to be sanctioned than
recipients without a problem. While domestic violence is not a significant predictor of sanctioning, there is a trend toward heightened vulnerability when domestic violence is present (odds p 1.24 and 1.20,
respectively).
Among the logistical barriers, recipients without a car are roughly
one and a half times more likely to incur sanctions than recipients who
own a car (odds p 1.49 and 1.39, respectively). This finding suggests
that transportation difficulties might be an important obstacle in meeting the welfare work requirements. In contrast to other studies, the
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presence of child-care problems does not appear to be a significant
barrier.7 However, caring for an ill or disabled household member increases recipients’ risk of being sanctioned (odds p 1.6 in both models).
Knowledge of the Rules and Awareness of Sanctions
Recipients’ knowledge about the causes of sanctions was assessed to test
the second premise that welfare recipients are aware of the rules and can
rationally calculate the costs and benefits of complying. Excluding recipients exempted from CalWORKs’s participation requirements, 39 percent
of the study sample said that they were informed of all seven rules. However, 19 percent reported that they only knew of three or fewer rules.
Almost 90 percent said they were told that failure to attend orientation
is a cause for being sanctioned, but only 63 percent knew that they could
be sanctioned for not participating in an assigned activity. There are
significant variations across the four counties. Recipients in counties C
and D are twice as likely to know the rules as those in county A.8
The extent to which officially sanctioned recipients were aware of
those sanctions is tested by comparing self-reports with administrative
records. Results suggest that 41 percent of the 453 sanctioned recipients
identified through administrative records were unaware of having been
sanctioned. When excluding recipients who said that they were exempted from program participation, the proportion of recipients who
were unaware that they were sanctioned increased to 50 percent. In
other words, these recipients could not recall reductions in their welfare
checks because they did not meet CalWORKs’s requirements. This finding is similar to that of Wilson and associates (1999), who also find that
a majority of the clients in their study were unaware of sanctions against
them.
As mentioned previously, it is quite possible that the recipients in the
current study were unable to recall sanctions due to the elapsed time
between their first sanction and the date of our interview. To determine
how much this temporal factor influences the results, the length of
elapsed time between sanction and interview dates is compared for
recipients who were aware with those who were not aware of their sanctions. On average, there is only a difference of 1.3 months between the
two groups (p ! .016).
One possible reason that recipients may not have been aware of their
sanctioned status is the commonplace mixture of welfare with work. In
addition, the varying practices of local welfare offices could affect the
degree to which recipients were aware of having been sanctioned. To
test these hypotheses, a logistic regression model predicting awareness
of sanctioned status is estimated. It uses the previously discussed independent variables, augmented by a variable indicating the elapsed time
between sanction and interview dates. Again, we estimate two models,
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Table 3
Effect Parameters for the Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Sanction
Awareness (N p 364)
Predictor Variable
Model 1

Demographic variables:
County C
County D
Latino
Below age 24
Number of children
Employment barriers:
Some part-time work
No work
No high school
diploma
Logistical barriers:
No automobile in
household
Elapsed time

Model 2

e

eb

e

eb

⫺1.00 (.35)
⫺.63 (.36)
⫺.64* (.33)
.53 (.30)
⫺.19 (.10)

.36**
.52*
.52*
1.70⫹
.82*

⫺1.05 (.37)
⫺.73 (.38)

.34**
.47*

⫺.22 (.10)

.80*

.47 (.26)
.69 (.25)
⫺.05 (.02)

.49 (.27)
1. 27 (.34)

1.79⫹
3.56**

.58 (.25)
⫺.052 (.26)

1.79*
.94*

1.60⫹
2.00**
.94*

Note.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Only significant predictors are
shown.
⫹
p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

one without and one with work history. As table 3 indicates, in both
models, county, number of children, car ownership, and elapsed time
are significant predictors of awareness. When work history, which is a
significant predictor in model 2, is excluded in model 1, ethnicity, age,
and education become significant predictors. The differential practices
of local welfare offices clearly affect recipients’ awareness of having been
sanctioned. In contrast to recipients in county A, which is known for
its consistent efforts to counsel sanctioned recipients, recipients in the
other counties are two to three times less likely to be aware of their
sanctions. In both models, recipients with fewer barriers are generally
less likely to be aware of sanctions. This is probably due to the fact that
they are more likely to mix welfare with work, experience greater fluctuations in their monthly grant amounts, and so are less likely to attribute a reduction in their grant to sanctions. Alternatively, recipients
with greater barriers are more likely to depend on their welfare grant
as the primary source of income and as a result are more sensitive to
changes in the grant amount, especially if they perceive the reduction
to be the result of an administrative error.
Because of restricted access to the administrative records, it only is
possible to track sanctioned recipients for an average of 6 months after

316

Social Service Review

their first sanction. The average sanction lasted 2.9 months. Of the
sanctioned recipients, 43.7 percent were able to cure their sanction by
complying with the program requirements, 16.8 percent were terminated from the welfare program, and 39.5 percent remained sanctioned
during the last month for which data are available. There are considerable variations across counties in terms of recipients’ abilities to cure
their sanctions, with rates ranging from a low of 23 percent to a high
of 72 percent. The data also suggest that recipients who did not speak
English and those who reported domestic violence have more difficulties
curing their sanctions. On the other hand, the duration of the sanctions
was shorter among recipients who experienced economic hardships
(i.e., they reported difficulties buying food and clothes for their children, making rental or utility payments, or getting necessary medical
care).

Discussion
The findings from the CalWORKs study confirm what other studies
show: sanctioned recipients are more likely to be in a disadvantaged
position than nonsanctioned recipients. Sanctioned recipients face
more barriers to compliance with the work requirements. These include
being younger, having more children, having poor work experience,
experiencing substance abuse problems, lacking access to a car, and
having an ill or disabled household member.
These findings suggest that the reason sanctioned recipients fail to
comply has less to do with resistance to the work requirements and
more to do with the barriers that make it difficult for them to meet
these requirements. Indeed, when welfare policies and regulations acknowledge them (e.g., when recipients with mental or physical disabilities are exempted from work requirements or when recipients who do
not speak English are allowed to substitute ESL classes for work requirements), potential barriers no longer increase the risk of being
sanctioned. Moreover, the practices of local welfare offices are a significant factor in whether recipients will be sanctioned. Some county welfare offices expose their recipients to a higher risk of sanctions than
others, net of the recipients’ attributes. In addition, African-American
recipients, net of other factors, are more likely to be sanctioned, suggesting the possibility of a racial bias on the part of welfare workers.
These findings may call into question the key assumptions underlying
the behavioral logic of sanctions, namely, that recipients fail to comply
because they are unmotivated and are not truly needy. It could be argued
that such barriers as poor work experience and substance abuse indicate
a personal preference not to work. It is also possible that sanctioned
recipients care less about loss of aid because of other sources of income.
In the survey, recipients were asked whether they looked for work in
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the 30 days prior to survey, as a proxy measure of motivation to work.
When controlling for welfare status (being on or off aid at time of
interview), there are no significant differences between sanctioned and
nonsanctioned recipients. In addition, the annual household income
from all sources is significantly lower in sanctioned households than in
nonsanctioned households.
While recognizing that some of the barriers experienced by sanctioned recipients may be self-inflicted, we conclude that sanctions penalize recipients in greater need because these individuals face more
barriers to employment. Indeed, it might be argued that such a strategy
exacerbates recipients’ already difficult life circumstances by further
reducing their income and limiting access to needed services.
Equally questionable is the assumption that recipients are well informed about the rules and can act rationally in response to sanctions.
In fact, a significant proportion of the recipients report being ill informed about the sanction policies. Although the study may overestimate the number of sanctioned recipients who were unaware of their
status, it is clear that a significant proportion failed to recognize that
they were sanctioned. Not only do welfare recipients encounter complex
rules and regulations, but their monthly grants vary frequently. Some
of these variations reflect changes in reported income or household
composition, while others have to do with administrative vagaries, such
as errors in data entry and computation of financial need, or recipients’
failure to file appropriate forms in a timely fashion. Paradoxically, by
allowing recipients to combine welfare with earnings, welfare reform
may actually lead sanctioned recipients who are working to attribute the
reduction in their monthly grant to higher earned income rather than
to sanctions.
The logic of sanctions implicitly assumes that local welfare offices will
enforce the rules uniformly so that a consistent message is sent to all
recipients. The findings suggest that this is not the case. Local welfare
departments institutionalize enforcement practices that respond to the
political and ideological milieu in which they are embedded (Hasenfeld
and Weaver 1996). These practices in turn influence how readily welfare
workers resort to sanctions. Local practices, especially the interactions
between workers and recipients, also play a significant role in the degree
to which recipients understand the rules and can respond rationally to
them. For example, one county in the study invested considerable resources in counseling sanctioned recipients, seeking through such efforts to help these individuals cure their sanctions. As a result, 64 percent
of recipients in the county reported that they were aware of the rules
governing sanctions. By contrast, in a county where the welfare workers
communicate primarily through formal notifications, only 41 percent
of recipients reported an awareness of how sanctions work.
It may be argued that the chief aim of a sanctions policy is to send
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a warning message to the majority of welfare recipients and thus to serve
as a deterrent. The idea is that sanctions will discourage potential recipients who are not committed to work from applying for welfare.
However, as this study shows, the intended message is not heard clearly
when it is delivered. It may also come with a heavy price, both to the
recipients who are actually being sanctioned and to the welfare offices
that must invest considerable administrative resources to enforce it.

References
Born, Catherine E., Pamela J. Caudill, and Melinda L. Cordero. 1999. “Life after Welfare:
A Look at Sanctioned Families.” University of Maryland School of Social Work, Welfare
and Child Support Research and Training Group, Baltimore.
Cherlin, Andrew J., Karen Bogen, James M. Quane, and Linda Burton. 2002. “Operating
within the Rules: Welfare Recipients’ Experiences with Sanctions and Case Closings.”
Social Service Review 76 (3): 387–405.
Derr, Michelle K. 1998. “The Impact of Grant Sanctioning on Utah’s TANF Families.”
Paper presented at the Association for Public Policy and Management annual fall
research conference, New York, October 30.
Edelhoch, Marilyn, Qiduan Liu, and Linda Martin. 1999. “The Post-Welfare Progress of
Sanctioned Clients: A Study Using Administrative and Survey Data to Answer Three
of Four Important Questions.” Research report, South Carolina Department of Social
Services, Office of Planning and Research, Columbia.
Fein, David J., and Wang S. Lee. 1999. “The ABC Evaluation: Carrying and Using the
Stick: Financial Sanctions in Delaware’s ‘A Better Chance’ Program.” Report prepared
for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services,
Abt Associates, Cambridge, Mass.
Goldberg, Heidi, and Liz Schott. 2000. A Compliance-Oriented Approach to Sanctions in State
and County TANF Programs. Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Greenberg, Mark, and Steve Savner. 1999. The Final TANF Regulations: A Preliminary Analysis.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy.
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, and Dale Weaver. 1996. “Enforcement, Compliance, and Disputes in
Welfare-to-Work Programs.” Social Service Review 70 (2): 235–56.
Kalil, Ariel, Kristin S. Seefeldt, and Hui-chen Wang. 2002. “Sanctions and Material Hardship under TANF.” Social Service Review 76 (4): 643–62.
Kessler, Ronald C., Katherine A. McGonagle, Shenyang Zhao, Christopher B. Nelson,
Michael Hughes, Suzann Eshleman, Hans-Ulrich Wittchen, and Kenneth S. Kendler.
1994. “Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-III-R Psychiatric Disorders in the
United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey.” Archives of General Psychiatry 51 (1): 8–19.
Mead, Lawrence M. 1986. Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship. New York:
Free Press.
Nixon, Lucia, Jacqueline F. Kauff, and Jan L. Losby. 1999. Second Assignments to Iowa’s
Limited Benefit Plan. Washington, D.C.: Mathematica Policy Research.
Overby, Russell. 1998. Summary of Surveys of Welfare Recipients Employed or Sanctioned for
Noncompliance. Memphis, Tenn.: University of Memphis.
Pavetti, LaDonna, and Dan Bloom. 2001. “Sanctions and Time Limits: State Policies, Their
Implementations and Outcomes for Families.” Pp. 245–69 in The New World of Welfare,
edited by Rebecca M. Blank and Ron Haskins. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution.
Pavetti, LaDonna, Michelle K. Derr, and Heather Hesketh. 2003. “Review of Sanction
Policies and Research Studies: Final Literature Review.” Report prepared for the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, Mathematica Policy Research, Washington, D.C.
Polit, Denise F., Andrew S. London, and John M. Martinez. 2001. The Health of Poor Urban

The Logic of Sanctions

319

Women: Findings from the Project on Devolution and Urban Change. New York: Manpower
Demonstration Research Corp.
Rector, Robert. 1993. “Welfare Reform, Dependency Reduction, and Labor Market Entry.”
Journal of Labor Research 14 (3): 283–98.
Strauss, Murray A., and Richard J. Gelles. 1986. “Societal Change and Change in Family
Violence from 1975 to 1985 as Revealed by Two National Surveys.” Journal of Marriage
and the Family 48 (3): 465–79.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General. 1999. “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Client Sanctions.” Doc. no. OEI-09-98-00290. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Washington, D.C.
U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO). 2000. “Welfare Reform: State Sanction Policies
and the Number of Families Affected.” Doc. no. GAO/HEHS-00-44. U.S. General
Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
Westra, Karen L., and John Routley. 2000. Arizona Cash Assistance Exit Study, First Quarter
1998 Cohort: Final Report. Phoenix: Arizona Department of Economic Security, Office
of Evaluation.
Wilson, Laura A., Robert P. Stoker, and Dennis McGrath. 1999. “Welfare Bureaus as Moral
Tutors: What Do Clients Learn from Paternalistic Welfare Reforms?” Social Science
Quarterly 80 (3): 473–86.

Notes
The research on which this article is based was funded by the Welfare Policy Research
Project of the California Policy Research Center, University of California. The results
presented in this article are the authors’ only and do not represent those of the University
of California or any other state agency.
1. To protect the anonymity of the respondents, we omit the names of the counties.
2. This approach has been adopted by several states (see U.S. General Accounting Office
2000).
3. The results are essentially the same when these sanctioned recipients are excluded
from the analysis.
4. Many of these measures are adapted from the Women’s Employment Study at the
University of Michigan: http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/poverty/wes/.
5. We avoid using the term “sanction” because during the pretest phase we found, as
other researchers have, that recipients often do not understand what the term means.
6. According to 1999 state policy information obtained from the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database. See http://www.urban.org/content/Research/NewFederalism/
Data/StateDatabase/StateDatabase.htm.
7. This may be due to the fact that, at the time of the interview, 58 percent of the
sanctioned recipients and 45 percent of the nonsanctioned recipients were still on aid
and therefore eligible for child-care subsidies.
8. These multivariate analyses are available upon request from the authors.

